INTRODUCTION
The United States Army must move into the future and be prepared to win the wars of tomorrow. It must change or it will ultimately face defeat. There are examples throughout history where defeat is attributed to armies that failed to change. One way to look at this problem is to view it as a never ending staircase. As soon as one's foot is firmly planted on one stair, the other foot must be moving to the next step. If not, adversaries will move past. Although an army must change and move to the future, it is a bureaucratic organization that resists change. This is a paradox and serious challenge for senior army leadership. After wrestling with this challenge, today's senior army leadership is using the following approach:
The Chief of Staff of the Army and Commander, Training and Doctrine Command established the Army After Next (AAN) project in February 1996 to help the Army leadership craft a vision of future Army requirements. The project connects the process of change represented by Army XXI and guides future Army research and development programs. By 2010, the Army will exploit the Force XXI effort to achieve nothing less than a technological and cultural metamorphosis.
By then, over a decade of experimentation and field exercises will create a knowledge based force, Army XXI, balanced across our traditional imperatives and possessed with a clarity of observation, degree of decentralization, and pace of decision-making unparalleled in the history of warfare. AAN simply seeks to provide the Army of 2020 with physical speed and agility to complement the mental agility inherited from Force XXI. The purpose of this research paper is to examine military decision-making and make recommendations for improvement. It reviews basic system theory, military decision-making, and the RMA. Then it analyzes the impact of the RMA on military decision-making and makes recommendations to improve military decision-making for the AAN.
THE MILITARY DECISION SYSTEM
The purpose of this section is to provide a review of basic systems theory and the military decision system. It is important to understand the systems approach to military decision-making.
To that end, military decision-making as described in FM 101-5 3 and the Joint Task Force (JTF) Headquarters (HQ) Mission Training Guide (MTG) 4 is reviewed.
SYSTEMS THEORY
Systems theory is a theory of wholeness. process that reacts to these inputs, and outputs provided by the process. The outputs provide additional inputs to the system in the form of feed back to the process. 8 A system that consists of many interacting simple systems is often described as a system of systems.
MILITARY DECISION SYSTEM
Military decision-making as described by FM 101-5 and the JTF HQ MTG is a system consisting of inputs, a process, and outputs.
FM 101-5 calls the military decision system the military decision-making process (MDMP) (See Figure 2) . 9 The MTG calls the military decision system the Joint Task Force Planning Process (See Figure 3) . 10 The purpose of each system is to make the decisions necessary to defeat an adversary. The differences between them are semantic. For this reason I will use the Army MDMP as the basis to explain military decision-making.
As shown by Figure 2 , the MDMP consists of seven steps."
The MDMP begins with the receipt (input) of a new mission from In
Step 2 the mission analysis allows the commander to begin his battlefield visualization. The result is problem definition which begins the process of identifying feasible solutions.
Inputs consist of feedback on intelligence information, tasks, constraints, facts, assumptions, and staff assessments of risk. In
Step 6 the commander selects the COA he believes to be the best. If required the commander may refine his intent and CCIRs, and issue additional guidance. The staff issues a warning order with essential information so subordinate and supporting units can refine their plans. 17 In step 7 the staff develops the commander's decision into an order. Upon the commander's approval, the staff issues the order to subordinate and supporting units for execution. 18 When we examine all seven steps in the context of a simple system we find that we have inputs, a process, and outputs. The primary inputs are data that contribute to situational awareness (SA). These include but are not limited to intelligence on the enemy and the status of friendly units. The input feeds the process which defines the mission, identifies different COAs, compares these COAs, and ultimately selects the best COA to form the basis of an order. The output is the order provided to subordinate and supporting units for execution. The next section examines the RMA's impact on the inputs, process, and outputs of the military decision system.
RMA IMPACT ON THE MILITARY DECISION SYSTEM
The American people after the great success in the Persian Gulf will no longer tolerate heavy U.S. casualties. The way to achieve a victory with low U.S. casualties is to deploy decisive force so quickly that the enemy is overcome by shock and awe.
The ability to execute this form of warfare will be made possible by what defense thinkers call the RMA. 19 The RMA is the enabler for the AAN which is based on "speed and knowledge." The cognitive capabilities and decision-making abilities of the human may be overwhelmed. "The dilemma of new technologies is that they push combat potential beyond decision-making abilities." 27 Even armed with sophisticated information aids, future leaders may find their decision-making capabilities quickly overwhelmed. 28 Additionally, no technology is so perfect that it can't be countered -you cannot count on having perfect information. capabilities that provide nearly perfect information must be developed.
PROCESS
The RMA has done nothing, however, to improve the military decision-making process. The process of mission identification and COA development, analysis, comparison, and selection is not addressed. To fully utilize future RMA information technologies, we need a different decision process. Limitations are imposed by our human training and experience to think in terms of two dimensional maps and symbols. 30 RMA forces us to think in terms of the more complex four dimensions. We must get past our rigid structure of decision-making which includes step-by-step, left to right, and top to bottom sequencing. 31 
AAN research indicates that military decision-makers must operate in very compressed
planning and operating cycles at very high tempos.
32
AAN war games suggest that in future wars situations will change quickly and dramatically, which suggests that commanders must make decisions at consistently faster rates. 33 The AAN solution is to cultivate experienced leaders, build cohesive units, and improve soldier training and education. 34 There is no mention within the AAN framework of improving or changing the military decision process. 35 Additionally, as previously discussed, the three parts of the RMA do not address the military decision process. 36 
OUTPUT
The output of the military decision system is an executable order. Technology has greatly aided in the publication and distribution of orders. In the past, orders took great amounts of time to deliver. 37 During the War of 1812, the battle of New Orleans took place after the official cessation of hostilities.
The communications of the day were not rapid enough to carry the order to end the war. Today personal computers and computer networks allow orders to be published and distributed rapidly.
Once approved, orders are distributed over computer networks at the maximum speed allowed by available band width and system hard/software. In the future distribution capability will only improve.
The bottom line is that the RMA has had and will have an impact on the SA inputs of the military decision system. The AAN project recognizes this. Still the decision process has not changed and does not appear to be changing. Technological solutions have not been postulated, but technology has and will continue to improve the publishing and distribution of orders, thus improving the military decision system output.
IDEAS TO IMPROVE THE MILITARY DECISION SYSTEM
The AAN project and the RMA address only the military decision system inputs and outputs. The process of converting inputs to outputs has not been addressed. There is a reason for this. Army officers are locked into a mindset that inhibits us from looking beyond the existing process. Our technology has changed but our process has not. Colonel John Mitchell of the British Army may have provided an explanation for this in 1839 when he wrote:
Officers enter the Army at an age when they are more likely to take up existing opinions than to form their own.
They grow up carrying into effect orders and regulations founded on those received opinions; they become, in some measure identified with existing views, until, in the course of years, the ideas thus gradually imbibed get too firmly rooted to be either shaken or eradicated by the force of argument or reflection.
In no profession is the dread of innovation so great as in the army. 
41
In the information age we must leverage distributed decision-making. As mentioned previously, a commander stands a strong chance of be overwhelmed by the SA information that he receives. One way to overcome this is to distribute decisionmaking. A single decision-maker makes sequential decisions, one after the other. If he distributes decision-making over a larger number of skilled people, execution speed can be increased. 44 We need to develop tools to automate the COA analysis (war-gaming) process. We need combat models with fast data base builds, fast lay downs, and fast data reduction processes that run much faster than real time. 1. Flatten the command structure.
2. Distribute decision-making.
3. Automate COA analysis.
4. utilize video-teleconferences to allow subordinate and supporting unit participation in the COA development, analysis, and selection.
5. Introduce all changes at the JTF level.
These recommendations are not a complete solution for decision system innovation. They may improve the system but are still just incremental changes. Their implementation may help to stimulate innovative thinking that results in substantive change to the decision process itself. The future demands that we move beyond the current day "logical" and linear decision system. I do not propose the ultimate solution. I know we need to find one, and offer these recommendations as a starting point.
